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WITH MALICE TOWARD ONE
EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID*
"Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt
me." There are very few of us who have not at some time very early
in life heard that couplet. As children we suspected, or at least felt,
that it really wasn't true; as adults we know that it is false. Words do
indeed hurt, and they may hurt not only in ways that are obvious
and measurable, but also in ways that are insidious and invidious.
It is not surprising therefore that the common law came to recog-
nize that words-both written and spoken, but especially
written-had the capacity to harm sufficiently that they could be-
come actionable as a tort: the tort of defamation. For reasons which
are quite literally clouded in legal antiquity, the tort of defamation
became split into two separate torts, that of slander or the spoken
word and that of libel or the written word. With the exception of but
two states, Louisiana' and Washington,2 this distinction still holds in
the United States.'
This article will concern itself with the changing law of libel-one
may perhaps more correctly say the declining law of libel. It will seek
to give the New Mexico legal practitioner an overview of libel as seen
under the common law, by the American Law Institute, by the New
Mexico Supreme Court, and by the United States Supreme Court. In
particular, consequences to New Mexico libel law as a result of the
vigorous First Amendment attack on state libel laws by the United
States Supreme Court will be indicated.
LIBEL UNDER THE COMMON LAW RULE
According to the common law,
One who falsely and without a privilege to do so, publishes matter
defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the publication
a libel is liable to the other although no special harm or loss of
reputation results therefrom.4
Under this rule, any publication in the form of libel is actionable
even though there are no special damages and even though extrinsic
*Member of the Bar, State of New Mexico.
1. La. Civ. Code Ann., art. 2315 (West 1952).
2. Fitzgerald v. Hopkins, 70 Wash.2d 924,425 P.2d 920 (1967).
3. Although the distinction has become quite cloudy with the advent of radio and
television. Is a defamatory broadcast a libel or a slander? Both the courts and the statutory
law are in disagreement.
4. Restatement of Torts § 569 (1938).
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fact and innuendo may be necessary to supply the defamatory mean-
ing.
The common law rule continues to be the law in England today, 6
but there has been a very considerable controversy during the 1960's
as to how many jurisdictions adhere to the rule within the United
States. Writing in 1965, Eldredge claimed that 18 jurisdictions abided
by the common law rule concerning libel but Prosser vigorously dis-
puted this.7 Eldredge lists the United States, Delaware, Georgia,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin as following the com-
mon law rule.8 Prosser was originally willing to grant him only the
United States Supreme Court, Delaware, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississip-
pi, New Jersey, Wisconsin, and Texas,9 but has since conceded New
York and Oregon.' 0
THE VIEW OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
Because of their positions and reputations,' ' it was not surprising
that the debate between Prosser and Eldredge concerning the com-
mon law rule spilled over into the deliberations of the American Law
Institute (A.L.I.). What is surprising is the confusion it caused-with
direct consequences to the law of libel in New Mexico.
The Restatement (First) of Torts in its section 569 adopted the
common law rule." 2 During the formulation of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, however, a strong effort was made by Prosser,
who was then the Reporter for Torts, to replace the common law
rule of section 569 with a libel per se-libel per quod distinction.
1 3
Under his proposed distinction, a publication which does not carry
its defamatory meaning, or innuendo, on its face, so that the mean-
ing must be made out by pleading and proof of extrinsic facts, is
5. It frequently happens that a publication becomes libelous by reason of facts not
apparent upon the face of the publication. Innuendo is the requirement that the extrinsic
facts be understood in such a sense as to make the publication libelous. See, e.g., W. Prosser,
Law of Torts § 111, at 748,749 (4th ed. 1971).
6. Id. § 112 at 762.
7. Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 733, 747 (1965); cf.
Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1629 (1966).
8. 79 Harv. L. Rev., at 747, 748.
9. Prosser, supra note 5, § 107 at 782.
10. Id. § 112 at 763.
11. In 1966, Mr. Eldredge was an Advisor and former Revising Reporter for Torts and.
Mr. Prosser was the current Reporter for Torts of the American Law Institute.
12. Restatement, supra note 4, at § 569.
13. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 569 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965; Tent. Draft No.
12, 1966).
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termed "libel per quod" and is not actionable without pleading and
proof of special damages unless it falls within the specific categories
of slander' 4 which are actionable per se. 1 I Prosser's position was
strongly attacked by Eldredge, however, and the net result was that
in 1965, a "present sentiment" vote of the Institute favored reten-
tion of the common law rule.' 6
In 1966, Prosser renewed the fight and once again sought to have
the Institute adopt a libel per se-libel per quod distinction. The net
result was a long and involved debate ending in what purported to be
a compromise.' The compromise was an amendment to the com-
mon law rule so that it read:
One who falsely and without a privilege to do so, publishes matter
defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the publication
a libel is liable to the other although no special harm or loss of
reputation results therefrom, unless he knew or should have known
of the extrinsic facts which are necessary to make the statement
defamatory in its innuendo.'" (Emphasis supplied.)
The primary objection raised to this amendment was that there was
no case law to back it up, and, as a consequence, the Institute in
adopting it would be making law rather than restating or codifying
it.' 9 This should have been a telling argument against the amend-
ment because it was based on the very philosophy on which the
various restatements of the law were formulated. The proponents of
the amendment took the position that although there was no lan-
guage in any decision-aside from dictum in one California case-
which directly supported the amendment, nonetheless it was what
the courts really intended, and moreover it was the right thing to
do.2 0
Remarkably enough, the amendment carried 69 to 58,2'1 even
though, as Eldredge was later to point out,2 2 it made no sense!
Apparently, this point finally became clear to the Institute also, for
after a lunch break, Prosser indicated to the assemblage that the
14. See note 40 infra.
15. See Restatement, supra note 13, at § 569, comment d.
16. Id. at Note to Institute.
17. 43 A.L.I. Proceedings 431-471 (1966).
18. Id. at 448.
19. Id. at 455,456, and 463.
20. Id. at 457-459. The position of the proponents has also been explained as one in
which they were simply reflecting what the courts of the land were holding but not saying.
See Comment, Torts-Libel in New Mexico-Reed v. Melnick, 1 N.M. L. Rev. 615, 622
(1971).
21. A.L.I. Proceedings supra note 17 at 460.
22. Eldredge, Variations on Libel Per Quod, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 79, 80 (1972).
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amendment "becomes extremely difficult in terms of wording, and I
think the Reporter should attempt to draft another section and bring
it back next year."2 This seems to have been agreed upon, although
no vote was taken.
In 1967, however, no new draft was presented to the Institute.
Rather, Prosser, as Reporter, requested that the section be set at the
foot of the Institute calendar to await further developments by the
courts.2 4 Nothing has transpired since with respect to section 569. It
would thus appear that, insofar as the A.L.I. is concerned, the
Restatement of Torts still follows the common law rule.2 5
LIBEL UNDER NEW MEXICO LAW
The purpose of the compromise position tentatively proposed by
the A.L.I. in 1966 was to hold a publisher liable without special
damages only if he knew or should have known of extrinsic facts
which supplied the defamatory imputation to the publication. 26 As
has been stated earlier, a major difficulty with this compromise was
that there was no case law supporting it.2 " Nonetheless, in 1970
with the decision in Reed v. Melnick,2 8 New Mexico became the
first-and thus far the only-jurisdiction to accept the compromise
position 2 9 when it adopted the following rule:
One who falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes mat-
ter defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the publica-
tion a libel, is liable to the other although no special harm or loss of
reputation results therefrom; provided, however, that where the
defamatory character of the writing can only be shown by reference
to extrinsic facts the plaintiff must plead and prove either: (1) that
the publisher knew or should have known of the extrinsic facts
which were necessary to make the statement defamatory in its
innuendo; or (2) special damages.30
The New Mexico Supreme Court was of the opinion that this rule
adopted the old common law rule as stated in the Restatement of
Torts together with the intended meaning of the amendment adop-
ted at the 1966 A.L.I. meeting. 3 1 In taking this view, the court was
23. A.L.I. Proceedings, supra note 17, at 462.
24. See Restatement, supra note 13 at Note to Institute (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
25. Eldredge, supra note 22, at 82.
26. Prosser, supra note 6, at 764.
27. This may be one of the reasons why it has remained only a tentative proposal.
28. 81 N.M. 608,471 P.2d 178 (1970).
29. Prosser, supra note 6; Eldredge, supra note 22, at 80.
30. 81 N.M. at 610.
31. Id.
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apparently unaware that even Prosser, who was then the Reporter for
Torts of the Institute, considered the amendment as merely a tenta-
tive proposal.3 2 Further, the court went beyond the tentative
Institute position in that this rule allows recovery in a situation not
contemplated by the proposed amendment, namely, that of the inno-
cent publisher of libel who causes special damages.3  This situation
arises when (a) a statement is published which is innocent on its face
but when taken together with extrinsic facts becomes defamatory,
(b) the publisher was unaware of the extrinsic facts that made the
statement defamatory and could not reasonably have been aware of
them, and (c) the statement results in special damages to the one
who is defamed. Under these circumstances, the New Mexico rule
renders the publisher liable, whereas it does not appear that any such
intent can be derived from the words of the A.L.I. amendment.
To recover in an action for libel then, the plaintiff must either (1)
plead and prove special damages, or (2) show that the publisher knew
or should have known the necessary extrinsic facts in any action for
latent libel, also known as libel per quod, or (3) plead and prove
patent (or per se) libel, in which case no extrinsic facts are neces-
sary.34 This, of course, is a substantial change from the earlier libel
per se-libel per quod distinction3" which had been followed in New
Mexico, especially in that per quod or latent libel no longer requires
allegation and proof of special damages for recovery.
The decision in Reed v. Melnick does not indicate how libel is to
be defined under the new rule. Of particular interest is the question
of how libel per se is to be interpreted since it presumes damages and
does not require a showing of knowledge of extrinsic facts. Under
prior New Mexico case law, "any false and malicious writing pub-
lished of another is libelous per se, when its tendency is to render
him contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, or expose him
to public hatred or contempt, or to hinder virtuous men from asso-
ciating with him."'36 Although this definition has been cited as lately
as the Court of Appeals decision in Reed v. Melnick,3 I it is in reality
more than 60 years old and was first cited in New Mexico in 1914."3
32. Prosser, supra note 6.
33. Eldredge, supra note 22, at 81.
34. 81 N.M. at 611.
35. For a discussion of this distinction and how it came to develop, see Comment,
Torts-Libel and Slander- The Libel Per Se-Libel Per Quod Distinction in New Mexico, 4
Natural Resources J. 590 (1965).
36. See, e.g., Thomas v. Frost, 79 N.M. 125, 127, 440 P.2d 800 (1968); McGaw v.
Webster, 79 N.M. 104, 106, 440 P.2d 296 (1968); Chase v. New Mexico Pub. Co., 53 N.M.
145, 148, 203 P.2d 594 (1949).
37. 81 N.M. 14, 16, 462 P.2d 148 (1969).
38. Colbert v. Journal Pub. Co., 19 N.M. 156, 165, 142 P. 146 (1914).
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There thus may be some question as to its validity under today's
circumstances.3 9
In New Mexico there is also some question as to whether the four
categories of slander per se, i.e., imputations of (1) a crime; (2) a
loathsome disease; (3) unchastity in a woman; and (4) those ad-
versely affecting plaintiff in his business, trade, profession, office, or
calling, also constitute libel per se. 4" There has been no decision
which has directly decided this point, although the New Mexico
Supreme Court in Reed v. Melnick stated that the Court of Appeals
in its decision on the same case held the four categories to be libel
per se.4 ' This statement appears to be in error. All that the Court of
Appeals held was that the publication contained matter defamatory
and of a prejudicial nature against plaintiff in relation to his business,
did so without innuendo, and was libelous per se. 4 2 The holding said
nothing about whether the four categories of slander per se were
being adopted as also libelous per se.
Perhaps because of its assumption that the Court of Appeals had
done so, the Supreme Court in Reed v. Melnick did not expressly
hold that slander per se is also libel per se in New Mexico. As a
practical matter, however, this would seem to be the clear import of
its language. Further, it seems likely that libel per se extends well
beyond the four categories of slander per se, since the court stated its
recognition that "very serious harm may result from false imputa-
tions not included within the four....-4
But regardless of whether the words may be construed on their
face to be libelous or instead require extrinsic facts, how is the
decision that they are in fact libelous to be made? The language of
Reed v. Melnick is decidedly ambiguous on this subject and is
probably correctly termed inconsistent.4 4 First of all, the court
states its agreement 4 s with the following excerpt from Martin v.
Outboard Marine Corp. 4 6
39. The following definition has also been used: "The term 'libel per se' is applied to
words which are actionable because they are opprobrious in and of themselves without
anything more." Rockafellow v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 74 N.M. 652, 656, 397
P.2d 303 (1964); Hoeck v. Tiedebohl, 74 N.M. 146, 147, 391 P.2d 651 (1964); Stewart v.
Ging, 64 N.M. 270, 273, 327 P.2d 333 (1958).
40. See, eg., the dissenting opinion of Justice Oman in Reed v. Melnick, 81 N.M. 14,462
P.2d 148 (1969).
41. 81 N.M. at 609.
42. 81 N.M. at 16.
43. 81 N.M. at 610.
44. The inconsistency has been discussed in Comment, Torts-Libel and Slander-Reed v.
Melnick, 1 N.M. L. Rev. 615 (1971).
45. 81 N.M. at 612.
46. 15 Wis.2d 452, 113 N.W.2d 135 (1962).
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*.. After proof is in, the court may decide the communication is
subject to one or more meanings, one being defamatory and the
other innocent, or all defamatory. If the only possible meaning or
meanings of the communication under all the facts in .the case are
defamatory as applied to the plaintiff and could only be reasonably
so understood by the recipient, the court may hold the language
defamatory as a matter of law and there is no question to go to the
jury. If the court determines the communication is capable of an
innocent meaning as well as a defamatory meaning, it is then for the
jury to determine whether the communication capable of a defama-
tory meaning was so understood by its recipient.4 7
Agreement with this excerpt strongly suggests that henceforth in
New Mexico, when a publication is capable of both an innocent and
a defamatory meaning, it is up to the jury to decide whether the
recipient understood it in its defamatory sense and thus whether it
was libelous.
Unfortunately, in the very next sentence the court contradicts any
such viewpoint by reaffirming the innocent meaning rule, stating that
as first set forth in Dillard v. Shattuck 8 "a defamatory character
will not be given the words 'unless this is their plain and obvious
import,' and that the language will 'receive an innocent interpreta-
tion where fairly susceptible to it.' ""
Retention of the innocent meaning rule presents some substantial
difficulties for the rule of libel ennunciated in Reed v. Melnick. For
example, is the innocent meaning rule now applicable to both patent
or per se libel and latent or per quod libel? This would seem to be
the import of the court's language, although prior case law has
applied the rule only to libel per se. 50 If so, then recovery for latent
or per quod libel where the defamatory character of the writing must
be shown by reference to extrinsic facts is effectively precluded. This
follows from the fact that if reference to extrinsic facts is necessary,
the publication on its face must per se be fairly susceptible to an
innocent interpretation. This, of course, is contradictory to and
renders meaningless a goodly portion of the rule of libel the court
had just stated. The only way to avoid such a contradiction is to
assume the intent of the court was to reaffirm the application of the
innocent meaning rule only to libel per se. If this is indeed the case,
47. 113 N.W.2d at 140.
48. 36 N.M. 202, 11 P.2d 543 (1932).
49. 81 N.M. at 612.
SO. See, e.g., Thomas v. Frost, 79 N.M. 125, 127, 440 P.2d 800 (1968); McGaw v.
Webster, 79 N.M. 104, 106,440 P.2d 296 (1968); Rocafellow v. New Mexico State Tribune
Co., 74 N.M. 652, 656, 397 P.2d 303 (1964); Hoeck v. Tiedebohl, 74 N.M. 146, 147, 391
P.2d 651 (1964); Del Rico Co. v. New Mexican, 56 N.M. 538, 548, 246 P.2d 206 (1952).
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then future New Mexico libel actions may find the plaintiff in the
unusual position of seeking to have the purported defamation treated
as libel per quod to avoid possible application of the innocent mean-
ing rule.
Secondly, even assuming the innocent meaning rule is applicable
only to libel per se, its interpretation by the courts heretofore
suggests that it will unduly restrict recovery even there. Thus, while
the New Mexico Supreme Court states that the words will be given
an innocent interpretation "if fairly susceptible to it," the prior deci-
sions hold that if the words can have an innocent meaning, then they
are not libelous per se. For example, in Del Rico Co. v. New
Mexican,5 the court stated:
Furthermore, the statements claimed to be libelous, if such per se,
must carry but a single meaning, and it an opprobrious or defama-
tory one. The language said to be libelous should be given its plain
and natural meaning and be viewed by the court as other people
reading it would ordinarily understand and give it meaning.5 2
This language has been cited with approval in subsequent cases,5
with the appellate courts ignoring the inconsistency of viewing as the
common folk do and yet requiring the publication to carry only a
defamatory meaning in order to be libelous per se. The decisions
clearly show that even though "other people" may view a publica-
tion capable of two meanings as libelous, the appellate courts have
not done so.5 4
Thus although the holding in Reed v. Melnick was intended to
remove New Mexico from the libel per se-libel per quod quagmire,
retention of the innocent meaning rule indicates that the quagmire is
deeper and stickier than even the New Mexico Supreme Court
realized. What the intent of the New Mexico Supreme Court is, how-
ever, may well have been rendered largely irrelevant by recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court expanding the scope of
the constitutional privilege against libel.
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
A series of cases5 I decided by the U.S. Supreme Court beginning
in 1964 and continuing through 1971 have shown that Prosser was
remarkably prescient in placing section 569 of the Restatement of
51. 56 N.M. 538, 246 P.2d 206 (1952).
52. 56 N.M. at 548.
53. See note 50 supra.
54. See, e.g., Perea v. First State Bank, 84 N.M. 326, 503 P.2d 150 (1972); MeGaw v.
Webster, 79 N.M. 104, 440 P.2d 296 (1968).
55. 403 U.S. at 30 n. 1,91 S.Ct. at 1813 n. 1.
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Torts at the bottom of the A.L.I. calendar. These cases, in which the
Court considered the limitations on state libel laws imposed by the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press, have
substantially gutted section 569 in both its original and compromise
form' 6 and have rendered almost all state libel laws-New Mexico's
included-obsolete.
The assault on state libel laws began with the celebrated decision
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' " in which the Court first stated
the rule that a public official may not recover damages "for a defam-
atory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not."5 I In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, I9 the Court extended the
rule to public figures. Finally, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.6"
three Justices stated that "drawing a distinction between 'public' and
'private' figures makes no sense in terms of the First Amendment
guarantees." 6 I They then announced that "the determinant whether
the First Amendment applies to state libel actions is whether the
utterance involved concerns an issue of public or general concern,
albeit leaving the delineation of the reach of that term to future
cases."
6 2
Rosenbloom is an unfortunate case in the sense that there was no
clear cut majority opinion. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered one
opinion concurred in by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun;
Justices White and Black filed separate concurring opinions; Justices
Marshall and Stewart joined in one dissenting opinion, while Justice
Harlan filed yet another dissenting opinion; and Justice Douglas took
no part. The plethora of views thus presented should nonetheless be
carefully read by every attorney who may deal with a libel action,
for Rosenbloom and the cases that preceded it present vast implic-
ations for state libel laws. What these are is perhaps best stated by
Mr. Justice White who, writing for himself alone, summarized the
views of at least five members of the Court as supporting the follow-
ing rules:
For public officers and public figures to recover for damage to
their reputations for libelous falsehoods, they must prove either
56. For the effect of these cases on §569, see Keeton, Some Implications of the Consti-
tutional Privilege to Defame, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 59 (1972).
57. 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964).
58. 376 U.S. at 279, 280, 84 S.Ct. at 726.
59. 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975 (1967).
60. 403 U.S. 29,91 S.Ct. 1811 (1971).
61. 403 U.S. at 45,46, 91 S.Ct. at 1821.
62. 403 U.S. at 44,45,91 S.Ct. at 1820.
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knowing or reckless disregard of the truth. All other plaintiffs must
prove at least negligent falsehood, but if the publication about them
was in an area of legitimate public interest, then they too must prove
deliberate or reckless error. In all actions for libel or slander, actual
damages must be proved, and awards of punitive damages will be
strictly limited.6 3
If this is indeed the viewpoint of a majority of the Supreme Court,
then the rule of libel set forth in Reed v. Melnick is largely negated.
Consider the requirement of "actual malice" as established by either
knowing or reckless falsehood. Most civil litigation is decided on the
basis of the "reasonable man" standard. If a preponderance of the
evidence shows the defendant did not act as a reasonable man, i.e.,
was negligent, then the case is decided in favor of the plaintiff in the
absence of some privilege. Not so here. The reasonable man standard
is expressly rejected.64 Rather, "reckless conduct is not measured by
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published.... There
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defen-
dant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publica-
tion."6 In most cases this places an overwhelming burden of proof
on the plaintiff, and one he is incapable of sustaining.
The Court was well aware that "it may be said that such a test
puts a premium on ignorance, encourages the irresponsible publisher
not to inquire, and permits the issue to be determined by the defen-
dant's testimony that he published the statement in good faith and
unaware of its probable falsity."'6 6 While this may result in libelous
publications, a majority of the Court is of the opinion that "it is
essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publica-
tions as well as true ones."'6 7 Their reasoning is based on the premise
that to hold otherwise would result in the specter of self-censorship
which is, per se, evil.6 8
Up to this point no mention has been made as to whether the First
Amendment privilege applies to private individuals or only to the
press, or the media as it is more often called of late. Most-but not
all-of the libel cases considered by the Court since New York Times
have involved actions against the media. 69 Although this point was
63. 403 U.S. at 59, 91 S.Ct. at 1827.
64. 403 U.S. at 50, 51, 91 S.Ct. at 1823; see also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S.
265,276, 91 S.Ct. 621, 627 (1971).
65. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325 (1968).
66. 390 U.S. at 731, 88 S.Ct. at 1326.
67. 390 U.S. at 732, 88 S.Ct. at 1326.
68. Id.; see also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 50, 91 S.Ct. 1811 (1971).
69. For a brief listing of plaintiffs and defendants in these cases, see 403 U.S. at 30 n. 1,
91 S.Ct. at 1813 n. 1.
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never expressly ruled on in Rosenbloom, which was an action against
the operator of a radio station, there is reason to believe that the
constitutional privilege does indeed apply to private individuals as
well as the media. At least one commentator has drawn the con-
clusion from Rosenbloom that "constitutional protection extends to
all reporting of events of public or general interest, not just media
reporting." 7 This is certainly strongly intimated in the opinion of
the plurality."' To take a contrary opinion would be to suggest that
certain First Amendment rights are more important than others, i.e.,
freedom of the press is more crucial than freedom of speech.
Accordingly, it is now reasonable to assume that the "actual
malice" burden is placed on any plaintiff about whom a publication
is found to be in an area of legitimate public interest, regardless of
whether the publication was by the media or a private individual.
What then is an "area of legitimate public interest"? In Rosenbloom,
the plurality, i.e., Justices Brennan and Blackmun and Chief Justice
Burger, stated, albeit in an offhanded fashion, that at least certain
parts of a person's activities may fall outside the area of general or
public interest72 and further that the courts are capable of identi-
fying where privacy prevails and the public interest ends. 73 Beyond
that, they declined to comment.
It may be that public interest will be equated with "newsworthy."
The California courts have looked to such factors as the following to
ascertain what is deemed newsworthy: (1) the social value of the
facts published; (2) the depth of the article's intrusion into ostensi-
bly private affairs; and (3) the extent to which the party voluntarily
acceded to a position of public notoriety. 7"
With one exception, matters deemed private rather than of public
interest do not seem as yet to have been delineated by the lower
courts, state or federal. The exception, however, is an interesting
one. Generally speaking, credit reports are held to be not of public
interest, so that the "actual malice" rule does not apply to libel cases
concerning them.7 5 The U.S. Supreme Court has at least obliquely
supported this point of view by denying certiorari to one case of this
type after Rosenbloom was decided. 76
Beyond the one credit report case, the Court has as yet had no
70. Keeton, supra note 56, at 63, 64.
71. 403 U.S. at 44, 45, 91 S.Ct. at 1820.
72. 403 U.S. at 44 n. 12, 91 S.Ct. at 1820 n. 12.
73. 403 U.S. at 48 n. 17, 91 S.Ct. at 1822 n. 17.
74. See, e.g., Goldman v. Time, Inc., 336 F.Supp. 133, 138 (1971) and cases cited
therein.
75. See, e.g., Oberman v. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1972).
76. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 92 S.Ct. 204 (1971).
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"occasion to consider the impact of the First Amendment on the
application of state libel laws to libels where no issue of general or
public interest is involved." '7  It appears likely, however, that at least
three of the Justices sitting when Rosenbloom was decided would
uphold a constitutional right to privacy in this situation while at least
three others would not.7
But even supposing that actual malice can in fact be proven in
cases of general or public interest, how many plaintiffs can meet the
further requirement, stated by Justice White, that actual darmages
must be proved in all actions for libel or slander. The New Mexico
cases suggest that the answer is almost none. For example, during the
two decades preceding Reed v. Melnick, when the libel per se-libel
per quod distinction existed, no appellate case is presented wherein
actual damages were proven for libel. This, of course, presumes that
actual damages means "special damages" as used in the parlance of
the New Mexico Courts. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that
not all the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court define "actual
damage" in the same sense. 79
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions culminating in
Rosenbloom, libel law in New Mexico is presently perhaps best
described as in a state of limbo. It may be that New Mexico libel law,
representing to a substantial extent the proposed compromise posi-
tion of the A.L.I., is affected to a lesser extent than is that of many
other states by the First Amendment privilege set forth in
Rosenbloom and its predecessor cases. But it is only a matter of
degree. All state libel law is profoundly affected. As a practical
matter, while recovery for libel may still be possible in certain
restricted circumstances, the trend is toward the demise of libel as a
tort.
77. 403 U.S. at 48,49 n. 17, 91 S.Ct. at 1822 n. 17.
78. Id.; see also the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 92 S.Ct. 204 (1971).
79. Keeton at least argues that the compromise position is affected to a lesser extent
than are the common law rule or the position advocated by Prosser and could be more easily
brought into line with the U.S. Supreme Court position. Keeton, supra note 56, at 74.
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